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Motivated by the goal of designing interventions for softening polar-
ized opinions on the Web, and building on results from psychology,
we hypothesized that people would be moved more easily towards
opposing opinions when the latter were voiced by a celebrity they
like, rather than by a celebrity they dislike.We tested this hypothesis
in a survey-based randomized controlled trial in which we exposed
respondents to opinions that were randomly assigned to one of four
spokespersons each: a disagreeing but liked celebrity, a disagreeing
and disliked celebrity, a disagreeing expert, and an agreeing but
disliked celebrity. After the treatment, we measured changes in the
respondents’ opinions, empathy towards the spokespersons, and
use of affective language.
Unlike hypothesized, no softening of opinions was observed
regardless of the respondents’ attitudes towards the celebrity. In-
stead, we found strong evidence of a hardening of pre-treatment
opinions when a disagreeing opinion was attributed to an expert or
when an agreeing opinion was attributed to a disliked celebrity. We
also observed a pronounced reduction in empathy for disagreeing
spokespersons, indicating a punitive response. The only celebrity
for whom, on average, empathy remained unchanged was the one
who agreed, even though they were disliked.
Our results could be explained as a reaction to violated expecta-
tions towards experts and as a perceived breach of trust by liked
celebrities. They confirm that naïve strategies at mediation may
not yield intended results, and how difficult it is to depolarize—and
how easy it is to further polarize or provoke emotional responses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Soaring polarization, and a concomitant decrease in civility, pose
a major challenge to today’s society. Research shows that in Eu-
rope [18, 38, 49] as well as in the United States [3, 5, 35], trust in
the mainstream media, public trust in science, and mutual esteem
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between people of different political convictions have plummeted
drastically over the last two decades, while partisanship among
politicians has starkly increased [1, 21]. People have always dis-
agreed with each other. However, the current political climate is
rendered fundamentally without precedence by the existence of the
Web, where extreme opinions, biased information, and fabricated
false facts (“fake news”) are proliferating and amplifying in echo
chambers [54] and filter bubbles [16].
To address these alarming trends, fight polarization, and ulti-
mately make the Web a more civil place, there is a need to convince
Web users to be respectful and seriously consider divergent opin-
ions. Social computing researchers have suggested to do so by
explicitly exposing users to posts from across the aisle [20, 33, 41].
Other research has, however, shown that these interventions tend
to not be effective, possibly due to confirmation bias [42], where
people tend to quickly dismiss divergent opinions when they are
too far removed from their own [4]. This outcome is in line with
psychological research, where it is well established that people
maintain confirmation bias in order to avoid cognitive dissonance
and readily accept opinions that support their own, while dismiss-
ing arguments from the other side [42]. Thus, haphazardly exposing
people to opinions from the other side of the aisle even runs the
risk of making things worse, by inciting spite and decreasing trust
in the mainstream media [3].
Recent research in psychology has addressed this issue by eval-
uating nuanced strategies for nudging people with extreme opin-
ions into revising them, which shows that a softening of extreme
opinions is possible—if done carefully. For instance, Bruneau and
colleagues [9, 10] demonstrated that collective blame of Muslims for
individual acts of violence, and thereby anti-Muslim hostility, could
be reduced by highlighting hypocrisy (e.g., by making a Christian
who collectively blamed Muslims realize that they would not collec-
tively blame Christians for acts of violence committed by individual
Christians). Similarly, Hameiri and colleagues [23, 24] have demon-
strated the effectiveness of paradoxical thinking interventions for
softening extreme opinions.
Inspired by these works (see also the related work in Section 2)
and with the eventual goal of making the Web a better place, we
initially set out to explore further strategies for softening polarized
opinions. Psychology has shown that people frequently identify
with celebrities, building a pseudo-personal, one-way rapport with
them [6], a phenomenon that has for a long time been leveraged
by marketeers, who successfully use celebrities as spokespersons
in product ads [17, 39]. Hence, it seems reasonable to suspect that
people might be more willing to accept an opposing opinion if it
comes from a celebrity they know, like, and trust. Indeed, there
is strong evidence to suggest that liked persons [50], including
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celebrities [7, 27, 28], can shift others’ opinions, and that individuals
tend to adapt their opinions and attitudes to persons whom they
like and with whom they identify [14, 26].
Building on these results, we hypothesized that
(1) people would be more easily convinced to soften their ex-
treme opinions if the opposite opinion was voiced by a
celebrity they liked, compared to a celebrity they disliked.
Additionally, we hypothesized that
(2) people would be more easily convinced by an expert to-
wards whom they had no prior disposition than by a disliked
celebrity, and that
(3) people could be pushed away from their current opinion if
that opinion was shared by a celebrity they disliked.
Testing the above hypotheses is not straightforward, since peo-
ple’s opinions about topics and their sympathies for others are
intricately intertwined, due to homophily [37] (we tend to form
bonds with those who are like us) and social influence [53] (we
tend to become like those with whom we already share bonds). For
these reasons, it can be difficult to find, for a given person and a
given topic, a celebrity whom the person likes but with whom they
disagree on the topic.
To exert finer control and to systematically tease apart agreement
from liking, we designed a survey-based randomized controlled trial
(RCT) that allowed us to attribute any opinion to any spokesperson,
and thus to measure the causal effect of a respondent’s fondness
of a spokesperson on the spokesperson’s ability to depolarize the
respondent’s opinions. In particular, we tested the effects of attribut-
ing disagreeing opinions to liked celebrities vs. disliked celebrities
vs. experts, as well as the effect of attributing agreeing opinions to
disliked celebrities. Additionally, we measured how being exposed
to a spokesperson’s opinion shifted the respondent’s empathy for
that spokesperson.
Results obtained by deploying the study to 379 respondents on
the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform refuted our
initial hypotheses. No matter whether the respondent liked or dis-
liked the celebrity to whom an opposing opinion was attributed,
we, on average, never observed a softening of opinions. Neither
did neutral experts provide the expected result. Opposite to our
hypothesis, we found strong evidence of further hardening of opin-
ions in the expert condition (i.e., away from the expert’s opinion,
further polarizing the respondent’s previously held opinion). We
also found evidence of vindictive behavior, whereby disagreement
by a spokesperson was “punished” by a reduction in the respon-
dent’s empathy for pain that the spokesperson experienced. The
only spokesperson for whom empathy remained unchanged was
the one who agreed with the respondent, despite being disliked.
Analyzing linguistic cues in written opinion statements provided
by the respondents supported these findings.
These results confirm that naïve strategies for softening extreme
opinions may yield counterproductive results, and highlight how
hard it is to depolarize opinions—and how easy it is to create emo-
tional reactions and further polarize already-polarized opinions.
Contributions. To summarize our contributions, we
(1) designed a survey-based RCT to measure the aptitude of
celebrity and expert spokespersons for softening polarized
opinions (Section 3);
(2) deployed the survey to 379 carefully selected respondents
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Section 4); and
(3) showed that in no condition was depolarization achieved.
The only observed shift was a further polarization toward
previously held opinions (Section 5). We conclude the paper
by discussing the implications of these results (Section 6).
2 RELATEDWORK
In addition to the above-cited works, our research is informed by
work that can be categorized into three groups, namely polarization
and the backfire effect, the role of celebrity spokespersons, and the
relevance of conveying scientific agreement.
Polarization and backfire effect. The difficulty of changing peo-
ple’s previously held opinions and attitudes is well known [25].
While personal engagement has been shown to reduce polarization
even on partisan topics in offline settings [19], depolarization in
online settings appears to be especially challenging. Attempts at
depolarizing extreme opinions held by Web users may lead to unde-
sired and even opposite effects, commonly known as the “backfire
effect” [43]. For example, studies on the exposure to opposing views
on social media have demonstrated a resulting increase, rather than
a decrease, in political polarization [4]. Even actively aiming to
increase empathy by creating situations in which people are en-
couraged to “put themselves in the shoes of others” and to take
another’s perspective holds the potential for creating such a back-
fire effect [12]. However, the existence of the effect is debated in
the literature, and other studies have found no evidence for it [58].
Various explanations have been offered for this discrepancy in find-
ings, including the observation that the susceptibility to polarizing
opinions may be explained by a lack of reasoning, rather than by
motivated reasoning [46], which might entirely preclude a change
in opinion, depending on the situation in which the observation of
a change is expected. We extend this line of research by exposing
respondents to conditions that vary in terms of the identity of the
spokesperson (celebrity vs. scientific/academic expert), the attitude
towards the spokesperson (like vs. dislike), and opinion congruence
(agree vs. disagree).
Celebrity spokespersons. The use of celebrities as spokesper-
sons is well researched in marketing [17, 39], showing that the
one-sided, pseudo-personal bond that everyday people form with
celebrities [6] can be exploited to influence their behavior.While the
similar effect of celebrity endorsement of political ideas has been
considered in prior work [27], the effect of a celebrity spokesperson
on the level of polarization is not clearly established. Celebrities
with whom the public is merely familiar but towards whom they
do not have a favorable opinion may have a negative effect, while
celebrities who are viewed favorably consistently have positive
effects [27]. In this study, we experimentally investigate the effect
of celebrity spokesperson attribution on polarization by exposing
respondents to agreeing or disagreeing opinions of celebrities whom
they like or dislike.
Conveying scientific agreement.Misinformation in general and
conspiracy theories in particular are known to have harmful con-
sequences. Indeed, the belief in such theories has been linked
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to serious societal problems, such as vaccine hesitancy [29], cli-
mate change denial [31], extremist political views [56], and preju-
dice [30, 32]. It is clear that scientific results play a role in opinion
formation, and it has been shown that the communication of scien-
tific agreement can neutralize the politicization of facts [55] and
thus counteract polarization. However, other research shows that
there are tendencies in partisan environments to deny the correct
interpretation of scientific results when that interpretation conflicts
with previously held opinions [57]. Therefore, in this study, we also
investigate the effect of a scientific/academic expert spokesperson
on the softening of polarization, and how this effect compares to
that of celebrities.
3 STUDY DESIGN
In an effort to mellow extreme opinions gently, we investigated if
the attribution of opposing views to well-liked celebrities would
have a softening effect on extreme viewpoints that people held on
a given topic. To measure the hypothesized effect, we designed
a survey-based randomized controlled trial (RCT) in which any
opinion could be attributed to any spokesperson. Randomizing the
opinion-to-spokesperson attribution thus allowed us to elicit the
causal effects of the different types of spokesperson on respondents’
opinions. Our design is summarized schematically in Fig. 1 and
briefly described here, whereas further details on the individual
components are given in the following subsections.
As motivated in the introduction, we tested four conditions:
• disagree/like: disagreeing opinion, liked celebrity
• disagree/dislike: disagreeing opinion, disliked celebrity
• disagree/expert: disagreeing opinion, expert spokesperson
• agree/dislike: agreeing opinion, disliked celebrity
As for the topics on which opinions were expressed, we chose
four contemporary and controversial topics of societal interest
(Section 3.1).
When compiling a pool of potential celebrity spokespersons, we
took care to ensure that the selected celebrities’ actual opinions on
the topics were likely to be unknown to the respondents in our study
(cf. Appendix A.1), as known opinions would have compromised
the validity of randomizing quotations to spokespersons.
For each topic, we selected two real quotations from a large
news corpus, one on either side of the polarization spectrum (cf.
Appendix A.2). The quotations were generic enough such that they
could be attributed to any spokesperson from our pool.
Selecting an opinion and a spokesperson for a given respondent,
topic, and condition required knowing the respondent’s opinion
about the topic and their attitude towards the spokesperson. We
therefore elicited this information in a screening survey (Section 3.2)
that we conducted before the actual RCT.
As a result of the above steps, we obtained, for each respondent
and each of the four topics, a liked and a disliked celebrity, as well
as an agreeing and a disagreeing opinion, such that each experi-
mental condition could be instantiated with a concrete opinion–
spokesperson pair. For the expert condition, we invented a fictitious
person named “Dr. Michael Barnes” who could be cited as an expert
on all topics. Using an invented expert further ensured that no
respondent could have a prior attitude towards the expert.
For each topic, respondents were randomly and uniformly as-
signed to one of the conditions (Section 3.3). These random assign-
ments were then used for the main survey (Section 3.4), which
consisted of three steps:
(1) Measuring the respondent’s pre-treatment opinion about
the topic and their pre-treatment empathy towards the spokes-
person that had been randomly assigned to the topic.
(2) Administering the treatment: exposing the respondent to
the opinion attributed to the spokesperson, via a mock task
in which it was stated that the spokesperson had uttered the
opinion. The respondent was then asked to summarize the
spokesperson’s opinion and describe how clear and convinc-
ing they found it.
(3) Measuring the respondent’s post-treatment opinion about
the topic and their post-treatment empathy towards the
spokesperson, by repeating the pre-treatment questions.
In the remainder of this section, we provide more details on the
individual aspects of the RCT.
3.1 Choice of Topics
Topic selection was motivated by two factors: (𝑖) established opin-
ion surveys that could be adapted for our purposes had to exist
in the literature on the topic, and (𝑖𝑖) the respondent’s opinion
on the topic could be expressed on a linear scale with opposing
viewpoints at each end. Furthermore, since any temporally lim-
ited interaction with written viewpoints is likely to result in only
small changes to the respondent’s opinions (i.e., a small effect size
should be expected), we also required topics with extreme polar
viewpoints, with which respondents were likely to be familiar. To
this end, we selected four contemporary topics of current societal
interest, for which we considered viewpoints at the opposing ends
of the polarity spectrum:
(1) Climate change: “Climate change is a serious threat that
all of us need to address” vs. “The risks of climate change
are vastly exaggerated”.
(2) Vaccination: “Vaccines are not harmful, they save lives and
protect the community” vs. “Many vaccines have serious
side effects and can cause severe illness”.
(3) Immigration: “Immigrants take jobs away from Americans
and undermine our culture” vs. “Immigrants are good for
our economy and immigration benefits all of us”.
(4) Abortion: “Abortions should not be allowed for anyone
under any circumstances” vs. “Abortion should be allowed
and should be the choice of prospective parents alone”.
3.2 Screening Survey
In preparation of the survey that contained the RCT, we conducted
a screening survey to identify viable respondents and establish
their opinions and their attitudes towards the pool of possible
spokespersons. The screening survey established the respondents’
opinion on each of the topics on a 7-point Likert scale, and the
attitude towards all candidate celebrity spokespersons to determine
whether they liked, disliked, did not know, or were ambivalent
towards the respective spokesperson. We also used this screening
survey to collect basic demographic data, including the state of
residence in the US, age, gender, and level of education. In the RCT,
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Figure 1: Overview of the randomized controlled trial. (1) Respondents’ attitudes towards celebrities and opinions on top-
ics are elicited in a screening survey. (2) Respondents are randomly assigned one of 4 experimental conditions per topic.
Spokesperson–quotation pairs that match the conditions are generated based on the screening responses. (3) The main survey
establishes respondents’ personality, as well as their opinions on the 4 topics and their empathy for the 4 spokespersons in an
empathy-for-pain test before and after treatment. Treatment consists of 4 separate interactions with the assigned quotations
(one per topic) that are attributed to the assigned spokespersons. (Pain test image adapted from Shamay-Tsoory et al. [48].)
respondents were assigned spokespersons in personalized surveys,
based on their responses to the screening survey.
3.3 Randomized Spokesperson Assignment
For each topic, respondents were randomly and uniformly assigned
to one of the 4 conditions listed at the beginning of Section 3, such
that each topic and each condition occurred once per respondent.
The specific quotation that was shown to a respondent was de-
termined by the randomly assigned condition and her opinion on
the topic as previously stated in the screening survey. For the dis-
agreeing conditions, we selected the quotation at the opposite end
of the polarity spectrum (or a random quotation if the respondent
had stated to have a neutral opinion in the screening survey). For
the agreeing condition, the matching quotation was selected.
Spokespersons were randomly assigned in a similar fashion ac-
cording to the like or dislike condition from the pool of celebrities
that were indicated to be liked or disliked by the respondent during
the screening survey. The attribution of quotations to spokesper-
sons served solely to gauge the respondents’ reaction to this at-
tribution, and none of the quotations in the study were actually
uttered by any of the attributed spokespersons (all used quotations
and their actual sources are listed in Appendix C).
3.4 Randomized Main Survey
The main survey containing the RCT consisted of 3 phases: (1) pre-
treatment, (2) treatment, and (3) post-treatment, each described in
turn next. The survey took approximately 45 minutes to complete.
Pre-treatment opinions and empathy. At the beginning of the
pre-treatment phase, we established respondents’ personality via
the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) [22].
We then gauged respondents’ opinions on each of the four topics
with a long questionnaire that we adapted from existing validated
surveys on climate change [13], vaccination [15], immigration [47],
and abortion [52]. Next, we asked respondents to summarize their
opinion on the topics in 2–3 sentences (250 characters or more),
and collected their condensed overall opinion on the topics on a
7-point Likert scale.
Furthermore, we introduced the respondents to the four specific
spokespersons that were assigned to them for the treatment phase
and collected their empathic responses towards the spokespersons
with an empathy-for-pain test [28]: for each spokesperson, respon-
dents were shown a portrait photograph, alongside one of four
different images of a human hand in a painful situation that is
likely to lead to an injury (cf. Fig. 1), in order to elicit an empathy
response. The respondents were then asked to rate how much pain
the spokesperson was likely to feel on a 7-point Likert scale. We
also asked the respondents to state if they believed that they would
be friends with the spokesperson, and tasked them to write a state-
ment of 2–3 sentences (250 characters or more) expressing their
attitude towards the spokesperson.
Treatment: exposure to randomly attributed quotations. The
treatment phase was realized as a mock task with personalized as-
signments that depended on the respondent’s responses in the
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Table 1: Summary statistics of RCT respondents.
Age Count Percentage





Over 60 25 7%
Education
No degree 5 1%
High-school graduate 123 33%
Bachelor’s degree 187 49%





Total 𝑁 = 379 100%
screening survey. For each of the four topics, respondents were
shown a quotation on this topic alongside a portrait photograph
of the spokesperson to which the quotation was attributed. Re-
spondents were tasked to summarize the spokesperson’s view and
state their own opinion on how effective the spokesperson was at
communicating their opinion: “Please summarize [spokesperson]’s
position on [topic], and describe how clear and convincing you find
the argument in 3–4 sentences (350 characters or more)”.
Post-treatment opinions and empathy. In the post-treatment
phase, the empathy-for-pain tests were repeated for each of the
four spokespersons, followed by a repetition of the topic opinion
questionnaires. These questionnaires were identical to the pre-
treatment phase. Finally, respondents were asked to explicitly state
their level of agreement with each of the four quotations on a 7-
point Likert scale. After the survey, respondents were debriefed on
the study and informed of the misattribution of the quotations.
4 SURVEY DATA
The study was conducted between August and November 2019.
We recruited respondents for the surveys from the pool of crowd-
workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We offered tasks only to
workers with residence in the United States, an approval rate of
previously performed tasks of at least 99%, and at least 5,000 pre-
viously approved tasks (for details about the study deployment,
see Appendix A.3). We collected data from 379 respondents, whose
demographic statistics are summarized in Table 1. Based on their
pre-treatment responses, we found the respondents to be largely
biased towards liberal views (for details, see Appendix B).
From the total of 1516 completed surveys (each of the 379 re-
spondents completed the survey for four opinion–spokesperson
combinations), we excluded 30 outlier data points (1.98%), defined
as 3 standard deviations from the mean.
In preparation for the computation of personality scores, reverse-
scored TIPI responses were reversed. Similarly, responses to the
detailed topic-specific questionnaires were reversed where neces-
sary for consistency such that higher scores corresponded to more
conservative views and lower scores to more liberal views.1
A respondent’s change in opinion towards each of the four topics
was measured as the opinion reported post-treatment, minus the
opinion reported pre-treatment. Since the opinion of each individual
respondent could change towards either polarity, we aligned the
opinion change in relation to the quotation that was shown to the
respondent, such that a positive value corresponded to a change
towards the polarity of the quotation that was used in the treatment,
while a negative value indicated a shift away from the extreme
polarity of the quotation.
Analogously, a respondent’s change in empathy towards the
spokesperson was measured as the post-minus-pre difference in
the responses given to the empathy-for-pain question. All scores
were standardized individually (pre-treatment and post-treatment)
prior to computing the changes in opinion and empathy.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of the RCT, with a focus on
the changes in opinion towards the topic, empathy towards the
spokesperson, and the language that was used by the respondents
in their opinion statements. We discuss the findings and their im-
plications in Section 6.
5.1 Change in Opinion and Empathy for Pain
First, to investigate the potential impact of demographic data and
personality on the respondents’ opinions and empathy-for-pain
scores, we computed Spearman’s correlations of age, sex, education,
and the five subscales of the TIPI personality questionnaire (ex-
traversion, agreeableness, consciousness, emotional stability, and
openness) with the mean change in opinion and empathy. We found
no significant correlations (𝑝 > 0.05 in all cases).
Second, we performed two separate repeated-measures analyses
of variance (ANOVA) to examine if the respondents’ change in
opinion and empathy varied across the four topics, against a null
hypothesis of no difference in the means of change. The results
revealed no significant differences in opinion change (𝐹 (3, 1134) =
0.317, 𝑝 = 0.813) or empathy change (𝐹 (3, 1134) = 0.411, 𝑝 = 0.745)
across all four topics (see Fig. 2a, c).
Based on the above, the effects of the spokesperson condition
on opinion and empathy-for-pain change were examined using
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) independent of topic
and without controlling for age, sex, education, or personality
traits. We employ a MANOVA in order to protect the analysis
from the inflation of the overall Type I error rate that would other-
wise be produced by multiple univariate tests [8]. For a significant
MANOVA, we separately report the univariate analysis-of-variance
(ANOVA) tests on individual dependent variables, i.e., the effect
of the spokesperson condition on opinion change and empathy
change. For significant ANOVAs (rejecting the null hypothesis of
no difference in the means across the four spokesperson conditions)
we then report false discovery rate (FDR; 𝑞-value = 0.05) corrected
pairwise comparisons of means for all spokesperson conditions. Im-
portantly, we also report FDR-corrected one-sample 𝑡-tests against
1The data is available at https://github.com/epfl-dlab/SpokespersonAttribution
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a null hypothesis of no change (difference from zero). The multi-
variate test was significant (Pillai’s trace = 0.013, 𝐹 (6, 2962) = 3.25,
𝑝 = 0.003), with a small effect size (Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.17, which denotes
the mean difference divided by the pooled standard deviation). In
the following, we therefore report the effect of the spokesperson
on opinion change and empathy change separately.
Opinion change by spokesperson condition. The model for
opinion change across the four spokesperson conditions was sig-
nificant (𝐹 (3, 1481) = 3.62, 𝑝 = 0.013), with a small effect size
(Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.17). In Fig. 2b, we show the standardized changes
in respondents’ opinion pooled over topics, split by the spokesper-
son condition (i.e., the treatment variable). In a direct comparison
between spokesperson conditions, FDR-corrected pairwise com-
parisons revealed a significant difference only in the amount of
change between the agree/dislike and the disagree/expert condi-
tions (mean difference ± standard error:𝑀𝐷 = 0.241 ± 0.074 with
an FDR corrected 𝑝corr = 0.007) with a small effect size (Cohen’s
𝑑 = 0.25). The difference between the conditions agree/dislike and
disagree/dislike was also small (Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.14) and significant,
but did not survive correction (𝑀𝐷 = −0.144 ± 0.073, 𝑝 = 0.0498,
but 𝑝corr = 0.149). Importantly, FDR-corrected one-sample 𝑡-tests
(difference from zero) showed that both the agree/dislike (𝑝 = 0.016,
𝑝corr = 0.040, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.25) and the disagree/expert (𝑝 = 0.020,
𝑝corr = 0.040, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.24) conditions resulted in a significant
opinion change. On average, the agree/dislike condition led to an
entrenchment of the respondents’ pre-treatment opinions, while
the disagree/expert condition caused the respondents to distance
themselves from the expert’s polarity even further.
Empathy change by spokesperson condition. The model for
the degree of empathy change across the four spokesperson con-
ditions (Fig. 2d) was significant (𝐹 (3, 1481) = 2.85, 𝑝 = 0.036),
with a small effect size (Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.16). Pairwise comparisons
between the four spokesperson conditions revealed a small but sig-
nificant difference between the disagree/like and the agree/dislike
conditions (𝑀𝐷 = 0.131 ± 0.048, 𝑝 = 0.007, 𝑝corr = 0.042, Cohen’s
𝑑 = 0.21). The difference between the agree/dislike and the disagree/
expert conditions was also small (Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.16) and significant,
but did not survive correction (𝑀𝐷 = −0.106 ± 0.048, 𝑝 = 0.028,
𝑝corr = 0.084). Importantly, FDR-corrected one-sample 𝑡-tests (dif-
ference from zero) show that respondents attributed, with small
to medium effect sizes, less empathy-for-pain to spokespersons
in the disagree/like (𝑝 < 0.001, 𝑝corr < 0.001, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.44)
and disagree/expert (𝑝 = 0.002, 𝑝corr = 0.004, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.32)
conditions, and marginally less to the spokesperson in the disagree/
dislike condition (𝑝 = 0.040, 𝑝corr = 0.053, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.21), in the
post- versus the pre-treatment phase.
It is important to highlight that in a direct comparison of mean
empathy levels before and after treatment, there were no signifi-
cant differences between spokesperson conditions in the empathy
rating before treatment (𝐹 (3, 1481) = 0.27, 𝑝 = 0.845) or after treat-
ment (𝐹 (3, 1481) = 1.11, 𝑝 = 0.345) across the four spokesperson
conditions. This shows that the change in empathy is not due to
spokesperson-specific variation in the pre- or post-treatment phase,



























































































































Figure 2: Mean change (post- minus pre-treatment) in opin-
ion (a) by topic and (b) by spokesperson, and in empathy
(c) by topic and (d) by spokesperson. Positive values denote
a shift towards the treatment quotation or an increase in
empathy, respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels
of FDR-corrected 𝑝-values (*𝑝corr < 0.05, **𝑝corr < 0.01,
***𝑝corr < 0.001). Cohen’s 𝑑 is shown for significant effects.
5.2 Language Change
To analyze the potential change in sentiment that is contained
in the statements in which respondents expressed their opinion
towards the four topics before and after the treatment, we extracted
words listed by Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) [51]
in categories that capture positive or negative affective language.
All LIWC word statistics are given as fractions of words in the
statement that belong to the respective word classes: (𝑖) negative
affective words, (𝑖𝑖) positive affective words, and two subsets of the
affective word class that consist of words conveying (𝑖𝑖𝑖) anger or
(𝑖𝑣) sadness.
First, we computed Spearman’s correlations to investigate the
potential impact of demographic data and personality on the mean
change in respondents’ word usage frequency for each of the four
topics. We found a few nominal significant correlations between the
change in word frequency for positive and negative affective words,
sadness, and anger with age, sex, and personality scores, but the
number of these instances matched the expected number by chance
for a 0.05 significance threshold (5 out of 128 correlations were
significant), and none of these correlations survived correction at
a Bonferroni significance threshold of 0.002). However, when we
investigated the potential impact of topic on the mean change in
respondents’ word usage frequency, a repeated-measures ANOVA
revealed significant differences between topics in the change of
frequency of positive affective words (𝐹 (3, 1134) = 4.27, 𝑝 = 0.005),
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negative affective words (𝐹 (3, 1134) = 7.035, 𝑝 < 0.001), and anger
(𝐹 (3, 1134) = 5.13, 𝑝 = 0.002). There were no significant differences
between topics in the change of frequency of sadness-related word
(𝐹 (3, 1134) = 0.345, 𝑝 = 0.793).
Accordingly, we used amultivariate analysis of covariance (MAN-
COVA) to test the differences between spokesperson conditions in
the frequency-of-use change for positive affective words, negative
affective words, anger, and sadness, while controlling for variations
across topics. The multivariate test was significant (Pillai’s trace
= 0.024, 𝐹 (12, 4437) = 2.99, 𝑝 < 0.001) with a small effect size
(Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.18). In the following, we therefore report the effect
of the spokesperson condition on the change in the frequency of
use of positive affective words, negative affective words, anger, and
sadness, separately.
Positive affective language use. The model fitted to the change
in respondents’ usage of positive affective words (Fig. 3a) was signif-
icant (𝐹 (3, 1480) = 4.12, 𝑝 = 0.006), with a small effect size (Cohen’s
𝑑 = 0.18). Pairwise comparisons between the four spokesperson
conditions revealed a small but significant difference between the
disagree/like and the agree/dislike conditions (𝑀𝐷 = 0.006 ± 0.002,
𝑝 = 0.001, 𝑝corr = 0.006, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.25). There was also
a small and a significant difference between the disagree/expert
and the agree/dislike conditions (𝑀𝐷 = 0.005 ± 0.002, 𝑝 = 0.012,
𝑝corr = 0.036, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.21). Importantly, FDR-corrected one-
sample 𝑡-tests (difference from zero) showed that the change in the
respondents’ frequency of use was significant only in the agree/
dislike spokesperson condition with a small to medium effect size
(𝑝 = 0.001, 𝑝corr = 0.004, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.35), where we observed an
increase in positive affective word usage.
Negative affective language use. The model for the change in
respondents’ usage of negative affective words (Fig. 3b) was sig-
nificant (𝐹 (3, 1480) = 7.34, 𝑝 < 0.001), with a small effect size (Co-
hen’s 𝑑 = 0.25). Pairwise comparisons between the four spokesper-
son conditions revealed small but significant differences between
the disagree/like condition and all other spokesperson conditions:
agree/dislike (𝑀𝐷 = −0.007 ± 0.002, 𝑝 < 0.001, 𝑝corr < 0.001, Co-
hen’s 𝑑 = 0.26); disagree/dislike (𝑀𝐷 = −0.006 ± 0.002, 𝑝 < 0.001,
𝑝corr = 0.001, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.26); disagree/expert (𝑀𝐷 = −0.006 ±
0.002, 𝑝 < 0.001, 𝑝corr = 0.001, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.25). Importantly,
FDR-corrected one-sample 𝑡-tests (difference from zero) showed
that the change in respondents’ frequency of use was significant
only in the disagree/like spokesperson condition with a medium
effect size (𝑝 < 0.001, 𝑝corr < 0.001, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.46), where we
observed an increase in negative affective word usage.
Indicators of anger and sadness.To further investigate the usage
of negative affective language, we consider the subsets of negative
affective words that indicate anger or sadness. In Fig. 3c, we show
the results for words that indicate anger, for which the model was
significant (𝐹 (3, 1480) = 4.82, 𝑝 = 0.002), with a small effect size (Co-
hen’s 𝑑 = 0.20). Pairwise comparisons between the four spokesper-
son conditions revealed small but significant differences between
the disagree/like and all the other spokesperson conditions: agree/
dislike (𝑀𝐷 = −0.003 ± 0.001, 𝑝 < 0.001, 𝑝corr = 0.002, Cohen’s
𝑑 = 0.23); disagree/dislike (𝑀𝐷 = −0.002± 0.001, 𝑝 = 0.015, 𝑝corr =












































































Figure 3: Mean change (post- minus pre-treatment) in fre-
quency of affective LIWCword classes in texts written by re-
spondents to explain their opinions towards topics. Positive
values denote increases in word frequency. Asterisks denote
significance levels of FDR-corrected 𝑝-values (*𝑝corr < 0.05,
**𝑝corr < 0.01, ***𝑝corr < 0.001). Cohen’s 𝑑 is shown for all
significant effects.


























































Figure 4: Mean change (post- minus pre-treatment) in fre-
quency of first-person pronouns in texts written by respon-
dents to explain their attitudes towards topics. Positive val-
ues denote increases in pronoun usage. Asterisks denote sig-
nificance levels of FDR-corrected 𝑝-values (*𝑝corr < 0.05,
**𝑝corr < 0.01, ***𝑝corr < 0.001). Cohen’s 𝑑 shown for all sig-
nificant effects.
𝑝 = 0.008, 𝑝corr = 0.024, Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.15). Importantly, FDR-
corrected one-sample 𝑡-tests (difference from zero) showed that the
change in the respondents’ frequency of use was significant only
in the disagree/like condition (𝑝 = 0.001, 𝑝corr = 0.004, Cohen’s
𝑑 = 0.34), where the level of anger increased.
In contrast, the results showed a slight overall increase in the
change of use of words that indicate sadness, as shown in Fig. 3d,
but this change was extremely small (Cohen’s 𝑑 = 0.06) and not
significant (𝐹 (3, 1480) = 0.422, 𝑝 = 0.737).
Exploratory analysis: use of pronouns. In our analysis of LIWC
words, we also explored the change in respondents’ use of pronouns
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in their opinion statements before and after treatment. Specifically,
we observed a significant decrease in the use of the first-person
singular pronoun “I” for all spokesperson conditions, while we
simultaneously found an increase in the first-person plural pronoun
“we” for all spokesperson conditions except disagree/expert, for
which we observed almost no change (Fig. 4). While there could
be mundane explanations for this effect, such as the fact that the
respondents were tasked to engage with another person’s opinion,
it could also be indicative of an increased sense of community as a
result of the task and the topics. Furthermore, given the sensitive
and polarizing nature of the four topics, this shift is also consistent
with the change in language as a reaction to a situation that induces
trauma or shock, which have been shown to result in a decrease in
use of pronouns that reflect the self (i.e., I-words) and an increase
in use of pronouns that convey a sense of community (i.e., we-
words) [45].
6 DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss the implications of our results for the
representation of opinions on polarizing topics in the online world.
6.1 The Impossibility of Opinion Change
In contrast to our initial goal for the RCT, in which we aimed to
soften extreme opinions by employing liked celebrities, we found
that changing the opinions that respondents held by confronting
them with an opposite opinion was unsuccessful. If a celebrity dis-
agreed with the respondent’s prior opinion towards the topic, the
attitude towards the celebrity (i.e., whether they liked or disliked
the celebrity) had no significant impact on the shift in opinion.
In the case of the expert spokesperson, however, we found that
disagreement led to a fortification effect in which respondents
became further entrenched in their own prior opinion. While con-
sistent with previous work showing that individuals tend to dis-
tance themselves from opposing opinions and take a more extreme
position [36], this effect in our study is specific to the disagree/
expert condition, which puts into question the perceived influence
of experts and their ability to mediate in such situations. One poten-
tial explanation for the observed rejection of a counter-attitudinal
expert opinion in particular, as opposed to the disagree/like and
disagree/dislike conditions, we speculate, is due to the fact that only
the expert’s opinion has the potential to invalidate the respondent’s
opinion on a scientific basis. Thus, our findings provide experimen-
tal evidence of a backfire effect [43], but only under this specific
condition, and extend previous research showing that there are
tendencies in partisan environments to reject the correct interpre-
tation of scientific results when that interpretation conflicts with
previously held opinions [57].
When considering the effects of being exposed to the opinion of a
disliked celebrity, disagreement led to no change in the respondent’s
opinion. On the other hand, however, agreement by a similarly
disliked celebrity led to entrenchment towards the respondent’s
previously held own opinion, in what seems to be a justification
effect (i.e., along the line of thinking “If even this person whom I
cannot stand agrees with me, how could I possibly be wrong?”).
This entrenchment is consistent with studies showing that people
generally surround themselves with those with whom they agree,
in part because receiving validation for one’s view of the world
is reinforcing [26]. Overall, none of the spokesperson conditions
were effective in mellowing extreme opinions, while two of the
spokesperson conditions—the disagree/expert and agree/dislike
conditions—led to entrenchment.
6.2 The Implications of Empathy Change
Overall, independent of the spokesperson, we observed a significant
decrease in empathy when respondents considered opinions on
climate change and immigration. However, when we split the re-
sponses by the spokesperson condition, we found that this effect is
likely a reaction to disagreement. Specifically, while we found that
there was no change in empathy towards an agreeing spokesper-
son, there was a significant drop in empathy towards disagreeing
spokespersons, independent of the respondent’s attitude towards
them (liked, disliked, or an expert who was not previously known
to the respondent). Not only does this finding mirror the results
of the changes in opinion, it also paints a clear image of punitive
behavior, in which respondents displayed less empathy towards
spokespersons who disagreed with their own opinion. Remarkably,
the agreeing position of the disliked celebrity seems to confer im-
munity from potential punitive behavior. However, the implications
for the exploitation of Internet tribalism are unfortunately still ob-
vious when we consider that none of the spokespersons ever truly
uttered any of the quotations that we used in this study. Thus, it
seems feasible to decrease someone’s attitude towards a third party
simply by falsely portraying them to hold a dissenting view.
6.3 The Implications of Language Change
While we only found the changes in affective language to be sig-
nificant for two spokesperson conditions (an increase in positive
affective language for agree/dislike and an increase in negative
affective language for disagree/like), these findings again mirror
the change in empathy towards the spokespersons. Thus, they val-
idate the assumption that agreement by a disliked spokesperson
will create a more positive inclination, while disagreement by a
liked spokesperson creates a negative inclination. The latter might
lead to a decrease in attraction towards the celebrity, which in turn
might limit the opportunity for future positive influence.
In particular, the increase in anger is substantial, which suggests
that simply encountering disagreement on a polarizing opinion,
including on the Web, can increase the likelihood of an angry re-
sponse and could serve as an explanation for the ease with which
discussions escalate. This is consistent with previous research show-
ing that verbal aggressiveness is a negative predictor of tolerance
for disagreement [34].
6.4 The View from Above and Beyond
In considering our collective results for opinion change, empathy
change, and language change, we find strong and converging ev-
idence that disagreement has no positive effect: (𝑖) respondents’
opinions did not change towards the viewpoint of a disagreeing
spokesperson, even when it came from a liked celebrity; (𝑖𝑖) re-
spondents’ empathy decreased towards disagreeing spokespersons,
indicating a punitive effect; and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) in the case of a liked celebrity,
a disagreeing opinion even increased the observed level of negative
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emotions in general, and anger in particular, that were expressed in
the respondents’ language. In contrast, the effects of agreement by a
disliked celebrity did not result in a change in empathy but resulted
in a hardening of the previously held opinion and more positive
language use, which may indicate the possibility of generating an
increase in empathy through sustained interaction.
Particularly troubling is the backfire effect of the position held
by the expert, which raises to question the role that experts can
play in counteracting misinformation and unscientific beliefs in
the online world, where they are frequently shared (consider, for
example, that climate change and vaccination—two of the topics in
this study—are prototypical examples of such misguided beliefs [29,
31]). In addition, the decrease in empathy for the expert, which was
substantial and comparable to the disagree/like celebrity condition,
may indicate a joint sense of disappointment in both experts and
liked celebrities when they offer a dissenting point of view.
With regard to the small observed effect sizes, we emphasize that
the study contained only minimal interaction with the quotation
during treatment for reasons of feasibility, lasting only a few min-
utes (or less) per topic. However, even this minimal interaction still
yielded a significant effect that cannot be discounted—and in real-
world scenarios, a small effect may be all that is needed. Consider,
for example, the small margins by which democratic elections tend
to be decided and the enormous consequences that even a small ef-
fect might have on the outcome. Given our central finding that it is
much easier to foment dissent, achieve entrenchment, and decrease
empathy, it is clear that this warrants further investigation.
6.5 Limitations
Given the complex setup of the RCT and the design decisions that
were necessary to make this study feasible, it is clear that it has
several limitations, which we discuss in the following.
Spokesperson conditions. The original aim of the RCT was to
investigate the softening of opinions by employing spokespersons
that differed in terms of likeability (like, dislike, and unknown ex-
pert) and (dis)agreement, resulting in six possible combinations. We
opted to only use four out of the six combinations since the inclu-
sion of two additional spokesperson conditions would have entailed
the inclusion of two additional topics and thereby increased the size
of the survey (and the cost) by about half. Consequently, the two
spokesperson conditions agree/like and agree/expert are missing
in our results. While this does not invalidate our findings, these
conditions would be useful in obtaining the full picture, especially
with regard to the changes in empathy towards liked spokespersons.
In particular the justification effect (i.e., the reinforcing of one’s
already-held opinion due to an agreeing, disliked spokesperson)
would benefit from further consideration by directly comparing the
effect between liked and disliked spokespersons that agree with
the respondent’s opinion.
Spokesperson selection. For reasons of feasibility, we also did
not design the study to investigate the effect of gender or ethnicity
on opinion or empathy change. We selected celebrity spokesper-
sons in a data-driven manner (see Appendix A.1), which led to an
under-representation of women among the celebrity spokespersons
(20% female celebrities, even though over 50% of crowd workers
were female). Due to the lack of ethnically diverse images for the
empathy-for-pain test, we also did not include spokespersons with
different skin colors. Future studies could focus on either variable.
A further variable that could be considered is a celebrity’s con-
vincingness throughout their career [11]. Finally, since we wanted
to ensure comparability of the findings for the expert condition
across topics (which we expected to perform well in softening ex-
treme opinions), we used the same fictitious expert for all topics.
In contrast to our results, a known medical expert spokesperson
was found to increase the engagement of social media users for the
topic of physical distancing during the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic [2]. Thus, an investigation into the performance of dif-
ferent experts (including gender and ethnicity) and of real, known
experts would be of interest to determine the factors that might
make experts more convincing. Such future research should also
consider the potential effects that could come into play in crisis ver-
sus non-crisis situations in determining the performance of experts,
and spokespersons more generally.
Topic selection. Due to the expectedly small effect sizes and the
substantial financial overhead of running a survey with even this
number of respondents, we intentionally limited the selection of
topics to those that are highly polarizing in the current political
climate. In subsequent, narrower studies that allow for a larger
number of respondents, the potential for opinion change in less
extreme settings with a lower risk of tribalism-related effects could
be considered.
Long-term change.We focused on short-term changes in opinion
and empathy for this prototypical experimental study. Thus, it is
unclear to which degree the effects endure over time or if lasting
change requires additional boosting. While the observed short-term
effects already stand to have a substantial impact in the context of
societal decision with small decision margins, a longitudinal study
is required to assess the long-term effects of spokesperson selection
on opinion and empathy change.
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
With the goal of shedding more light on the phenomenon of po-
larization, we investigated the potential influence of celebrity and
expert opinions on softening the extreme views of respondents on
topics known to ignite polarized debates in society. The results of
our RCT suggest that exposing respondents to opposing views of
liked celebrities is ineffective in mellowing their extreme opinions,
and—contrary to expectations—even leads to the expression of puni-
tive behavior and the arousal of anger and negative feelings. The
present research also speaks to a broader concern about science de-
nial as is evident from the backfire effect and respondents’ punitive
response induced by exposure to the disagreeing opinion of the sci-
entific expert. Thus, our findings suggest that spokespersons may
not only fail to have the intended effect of softening opinions when
their views are too different from the respondents, but that they
may actually backfire by moving people in the opposite direction.
Intriguingly, we also observed opinion hardening when respon-
dents were exposed to an agreeing opinion of a celebrity whom
they disliked, which was mirrored in the use of positive affective
language. A practical implication of this result is that it could still
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serve as a starting point in devising interventions for softening
polarized opinions on the Web. In our study, we examined change
as a consequence of dyadic interactions between a spokesperson
and a respondent. It would be intriguing to investigate whether the
influence of a spokesperson’s view on the respondent’s opinion
might be facilitated or mediated in the presence of a confirmatory
opinion from a third party, with whom the respondent knows the
spokesperson to be in tension. Such triadic interaction might help
to mitigate disagreements and control polarized debates. Extending
our knowledge of this complex opinion-change process is timely in
the face of increasing hostility in interactions on the Web, and has
the potential to identify effective strategies in making the Web a
more civil place for dialogue.
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A STUDY DETAILS
A.1 Spokesperson Selection
Celebrity candidate elicitation. Since the proper definition of what con-
stitutes a celebrity is vague, we determined the pool of celebrity spokesper-
sons in a data-driven manner by collecting from crowd workers on Amazon
Mechanical Turk the names of celebrities, from various domains, whom
they liked and disliked in a preparatory survey. We elicited celebrity names
from the areas of (𝑖) science and education, (𝑖𝑖) sports, (𝑖𝑖𝑖) politics, (𝑖𝑣)
movies and TV, and (𝑣) music. The survey was given to 103 crowd workers
that specified their residence to be in the US. Respondents were also asked
to input their two-letter state code. All responses were manually checked for
quality to avoid the inclusion of responses from non-native crowd workers
connecting via VPN and unfamiliar with US culture. Seven response sets
were discarded due to incomplete data, low quality, or invalid state codes.
Since responses were elicited as free text and thus extremely noisy, the
results were cleaned semi-automatically by applying multiple iterations of
string matching with a human annotator in the loop.
Celebrity popularity elicitation. Using the above pool of names, we next
determined the popularity and likeability of celebrities to select spokesper-
sons for the RCT. We discarded celebrity candidates from the pool of science
and education due to the overall low number of responses in this area, in-
dicating a low level of popularity. Celebrities in the remaining four pools
were ranked by mention frequency, and the twelve most frequently named
celebrities were selected for each pool (48 celebrities in total). We used a
second preparatory survey to determine (𝑖) the general level of likeability
and (𝑖𝑖) the public knowledge of these celebrities’ opinions towards the
four topics, to ensure that their opinions were sufficiently unknown to
attribute quotations from both ends of the polarity spectrum. Respondents
were asked to state whether they liked, disliked, were ambivalent towards
a celebrity, or did not know them. For each celebrity and topic, respondents
were also asked to state, to the best of their knowledge, on which end of the
polarity spectrum the opinion of the celebrity was located. We collected re-
sponses from 150 crowd workers per celebrity. The quality of the responses
was satisfactory, so no data had to be discarded.
Celebrity spokesperson selection. Based on the collected popularity
and opinion data, we then computed the unknown-opinion ratio for each
celebrity–topic combination as the fraction of respondents who did not
know this celebrity’s opinion on the given topic. After filtering celebrities
based on a lower threshold \ on the unknown-opinion ratio, we ranked
celebrities by their aggregated ratio over all four topics. Using this ranking,
we then iteratively removed celebrities from the pool (starting with the
celebrity with the lowest score) until further removal would have resulted
in instances of respondents who could not be assigned a celebrity with
(to them) unknown opinion. This point was reached at a pool size of 25
celebrities for three different threshold values \ = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 (with higher
threshold values leading to no celebrity candidates being viable and lower
threshold values causing all candidates to be viable). We selected these 25
celebrities for inclusion in the randomized controlled trial (for a list of the
celebrity spokesperson candidates, see Appendix D). During this selection
process, we found that all celebrities from the area of politics were discarded
due to their opinions being well known to a majority of respondents.
Crowd workers who participated in any preparatory survey were ex-
cluded from participating in the RCT in order to avoid bias.
Spokespersonportraits.We collected portraits of the 25 celebrity spokesper-
sons from theWeb. To ensure comparability between the reactions of respon-
dents who were assigned different spokespersons in the RCT, we selected
all portraits according to the following criteria: (𝑖) portraits were selected
to have a neutral background, (𝑖𝑖) the spokesperson was facing the camera,
and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) the facial expression of the spokesperson was neutral.
Expert spokesperson. To ensure that the expert spokesperson was not
known to respondents of the RCT and could be assigned to all four topics,
we created a fictitious expert. We used the image of Prof. Michael Rosbash,
who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2017, to create a likeness
for this fictitious expert. To reduce the risk of recognition by the crowd
workers, we assigned the expert the fake name “Dr. Michael Barnes”, which
did not result in noteworthy Google results in combination with any of the
four topics at the time of the study.
A.2 Quotation Selection
For each of the two polarities per topic, one quotation was selected to repre-
sent this viewpoint (for a total of 8 quotations). Quotations were manually
chosen to represent opposite ends of the spectrum on this topic (the full text
of these quotations can be found in Appendix C). For the extraction of a large
pool of contemporary quotations from which we could choose, we applied
the quotation extraction and attribution tool Quootstrap [44] to a corpus
of 129 million news articles provided by the online content aggregation
service Spinn3r.com. We pre-filtered quotations by keyword searches for
each topic, before candidates were manually screened to identify suitable
quotations.
A.3 Study Deployment
Deployment time frame.The collection of celebrity nameswas conducted
from 27 August to 3 September 2019. Celebrity likeability and perceived
outspokenness about each of the four topics was determined on 22 and
23 September 2019. The screening survey was conducted between 25 and
30 October 2019. Data for the RCT was collected between 1 and 27 Novem-
ber 2019.
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Figure 5: Frequency of respondents’ pre-treatment opinions
on the four topics on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from a
strong liberal view (1) to a strong conservative view (7) for
abortion, climate change, and immigration. For vaccination,
1 corresponds to a pro-vaccination view.
Respondent selection.To identify viable respondents for the RCT,we used
the screening survey as described in Section 3.2. Since India is the second
largest source of crowd workers outside of the US and Indian crowd workers
have used VPN connections to pose as US workers in the past [40], we also
included three Indian celebrities in the screening survey as a honeypot to
identify and exclude crowd workers with residence outside of the US (the
Indian celebrities were Virat Kohli, Salman Khan, Sonam Kapoor). However,
no workers had to be excluded since no worker was familiar with more
than one of these celebrities.
Based on their responses to the screening survey, respondents were
identified as eligible for the RCT if they liked at least one and disliked at
least two of the 25 spokesperson candidates (to match the trial conditions),
provided a valid US state code, were 18–68 years old, and stated in the
screening survey that they would like to participate in a follow-up survey.
Due to the writing-intensive treatment step in the RCT, workers were also
excluded if their response to a question about daily news consumption was
less than a sentence long or entirely empty (note that we only considered
length, not content, as a criterion, and sentences such as “I do not consume
any news” were considered valid).
Sample size.We determined the required sample size with a power anal-
ysis. Assuming a small effect size 𝑓 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.05, and a power of 0.80
for one group and four conditions, we expected to need responses from
366 respondents. Based on the respondent selection process, 499 crowd
workers qualified and were offered a customized survey for the randomized
controlled trial. Out of these, 379 workers completed the main survey.
A.4 Ethical Considerations
Approval for this research project was obtained from the EPFL Human
Research Ethics Committee. Before they took the survey, all respondents
were informed that their responses would be used as part of a research
project. After completing the survey, respondents received an explanation
of the true aim of our research project, were debriefed on the misattribu-
tion of quotations, and shown the original source for each quotation (see
Appendix C). All respondents were offered the option of dropping out of
the study after completing the survey, but no respondent made use of this.
B POLITICAL LEANING OF PARTICIPANTS
Based on the opinions elicited during the pre-treatment phase, we found that
the majority of our respondents—crowdworkers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk—held liberal views on all topics. Specifically, 72% of respondents had a
liberal or a leaning-liberal opinion on abortion, 80% on climate change, 66%
on immigration, and 84% on vaccination (for the full distribution, as well as
a note on vaccination, see Fig. 5). Our findings can therefore be interpreted
as an observation of a backlash in a pool of respondents who predominantly
hold liberal opinions, whom one would expect to be more tolerant (“liberal”
in the literal sense) in their reaction to an opposing opinion. While we do
not see a reason why this skewness would make the results less relevant,
future research could leverage a stratified sample to ensure sufficient power
to separately identify effects on both sides of the political spectrum.
C QUOTATIONS
To be able to use quotations at both ends of the polarity spectrum, we falsely
attributed quotations to the spokespersons. The following is a list of all
used quotations and their actual sources.
Climate Change
(+) “Climate change is a natural phenomenon. Carbon dioxide is not a
pollutant. On the contrary, it makes crops and forests grow faster.
Economic analysis has demonstrated that more CO2 and a warmer
climate will raise the gross national product and therefore the aver-
age income.” – Fred Singer
(−) “The impact of climate change is clear, from rising sea levels to more
powerful and frequent extreme weather events that put our families
and businesses at risk. We have an obligation to address the root
cause of these changes and that means limiting carbon pollution
from our power plants.” – Jack Markell
Vaccination
(+) “People think vaccines cause autism, among other things. This is
not true. This is a complete myth and parents need to know that
vaccines will protect their children against diseases like measles, but
also that they have to vaccinate children to protect the community
as well.” – Leana Wen
(−) “The medical authorities keep lying. Vaccination has been a disaster
on the immune system. It actually causes a lot of illnesses. We are
actually changing our genetic code through vaccination... 100 years
from now we will know that the biggest crime against humanity
was vaccines.” – Guylaine Lanctot
Immigration
(+) “Immigrants expand the U.S. economy’s productive capacity, stim-
ulate investment, and promote specialization that in the long run
boosts productivity. There is no evidence that these effects take place
at the expense of jobs for workers that are born here.” – Giovanni
Peri
(−) “It is time to stand strong for the American people. After years of
mass immigration, falling wages, and surging joblessness, isn’t it
time we focused on the needs of the people that were born here?
Isn’t it time we got our own people back to work?” – Jeff Sessions
Abortion
(+) “Amid a nationwide attack on those who seek and provide abortions,
the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the Constitution, and for that we
should all be thankful. Abortion is a legal, constitutionally protected
right that should be available to all women.” – Daylin Leach
(−) “I’m pro-life and I don’t apologize for it. I believe it is morally abhor-
rent to end an innocent human life, and I also believe it is morally
wrong to use the tax dollars of millions of pro-life Americans to
fund research that involves the destruction of human embryos.” –
Mike Pence
D CELEBRITY SPOKESPERSONS
In the RCT, we used the following 25 celebrities from film and TV (F),
music (M), and sports (S) as spokesperson candidates:
Aaron Rodgers (S), Adam Sandler (F), Adele (M), Anne Hathaway (F), Ariana
Grande (M), Ben Roethlisberger (S), Brad Pitt (F), Derek Jeter (S), Elton
John (M), Eminem (M), Jerry Jones (S), Julia Roberts (F), Justin Bieber (M),
Kevin Spacey (F), Kim Kardashian (F), Michael Phelps (S), Nicolas Cage (F),
Peyton Manning (S), Quentin Tarantino (F), Robert De Niro (F), Stephen
Curry (S), Tim Tebow (S), Tom Brady (S), Tom Cruise (F), Tom Hanks (F).
